Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

The U.S. position in the debate on space security has been that (1) space-based systems could be developed and used to obtain decisive warghting superiority over an adversary, and (2) these space-based systems, because they might give such an inordinate advantage over any adversary, will be attacked. The Russians and Chinese, in contrast, claim to be threatened by U.S. aspirations in space but deny that they pose a serious threat to U.S. space-based systems. They view the development of advanced military space systems by the United States as evidence of a growing gap of military capabilities limited only by technological--not political--constraints. They argue that U.S. missile defense systems operating in coordination with advanced satellite sensors would weaken their nuclear retaliatory potential. This dissertation argues that the positions held by both of these parties are more extreme than warranted. An analytical evaluation quickly narrows the touted capabilities and assumed vulnerabilities of space systems to a much smaller set of concerns that can be addressed by collaboration. Chapter 2: Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warghter Support Feasible? demonstrates the infeasibility of dramatically increasing U.S. warfighting superiority by using satellites. Chapter 3: What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites? makes the case that although U.S. armed forces rely extensively on its satellite infrastructure, that does not immediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by military satellites are diffused among large constellations with redundancies. Also, some of the functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other terrestrial and aerial systems. Chapter 4: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles demonstrates that anti-satellite (ASAT) intercepts are very complex under realistic conditions and that a potential adversary with space capabilities comparable to China's has very limited capability to use ASATs in a real-world battle scenario. Finally, in order to evaluate the chief concern raised by the Russians and Chinese, chapter 5: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security simulates a boost-phase missile defense system cued by the advanced Space Tracking and Surveillance (STSS) sensors. It demonstrates that even under best case assumptions, the STSS sensors are not good enough for the boost-phase missile defense system to successfully intercept and destroy an ICBM. Together, these chapters aim to narrow the contentions in the debate on space security thereby fostering the international colloboration and data sharing needed to ensure safe operations in space

Requirements and Feasibility for the Transition from a Ballistic Missile Capability to an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Capability

Ballistic missiles and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons operate using similar technological means but not with the same level of technology or engineering maturity. ASATs require more sophisticated systems engineering and integration requirements to adapt to the challenges posed by an ASAT intercept. The main difficulties arise from the requirements for detection in space and the high closing velocities needed to execute an ASAT intercept. These difficulties have been underestimated after the recent Chinese ASAT test by those who have suggested that other nations could in the nearfuture master this technology gap and convert their primitive ballistic missile capabilities into an effective ASAT weapons capability. This report examines whether Iran could use its modest missile capability to project a viable ASAT threat to US Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. The study suggests that, even if Iran has an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), it would not be easily able to leap-frog the technology gap from a ballistic missile to an ASAT capability. Unless it develops and tests the system vigorously and visibly, Iran would not project an ASAT threat. Chapter 1 of the report analyzes the capability of the Iranian Shahab-4 missile, including the velocity attained by the missile at an altitude of 1000 kilometers. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the total thermal energyemitted by a model satellite in the Infrared (IR) band of interest for the given ASAT characteristics. Using the total thermal energy in the IR band, the detection range from which the ASAT can lock on to the satellite is determined. Chapter 3 details both, the ideal and real-time Proportional Navigation Guidance (PNG) law simulation performed using the parameters obtained in Chapters 1 and 2. The miss distances and acceleration requirements are shown graphically to capture the nuances and limits in the capability of an ASAT based on current Iranian technology level. The conclusion explains the limits and assumptions of this analysis and scope for further work

The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System

The United States and Japan are jointly developing and deploying an integrated advanced regional missile defense system meant to counter threats from North Korea. North Korea possesses a large and diversified arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that could strike Japanese cities and military bases in the event of a crisis and cause measurable damage. The missile defense system currently in place provides strong kinematic defensive coverage over Japanese territory. However, in general, the offense enjoys a strong cost advantage. It is impractical to deploy as many defensive interceptors as there are offensive missiles, which, in turn, limits the efficiency of missile defenses. It should be understood that regional missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific are neither capable nor expected to provide 100% defense. Rather, their goal is to provide sufficient capability to bolster deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to provide enough defense in the initial stages of a crisis to protect vital military assets. Additionally, U.S. and Japanese forces apparently also need to develop a better command and control architecture to operate the Asia-Pacific regional missile defense system. Finally, while the system is meant to defend only against regional threats, China has argued that the system might in the future be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs, thereby diluting its strategic deterrent against the United States. Maintaining effective defenses against North Korea while reassuring China will be one of the major challenges the U.S. and Japan face in their missile defense endeavor

Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century

The following papers were commissioned as part of the Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century project supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC). The papers have two general purposes: 1) to create a body of work that provides an overview of the missile defense developments in major regions of the world; and 2) to provide emerging scholars the opportunity to conduct research, publish, and connect with each other. We believe we have succeeded on both counts. The papers written for this project will be valuable for academics and policymakers alike, and will be published and disseminated by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. This element of the project has also been successful in further bringing together a new cadre of experts in the field and developing the next generation of academics and public servants who will benefit from their participation in this project. These papers were completed in the Fall of 2016